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MULTIRACIAL MALAISE:  MULTIRACIAL 
AS A LEGAL RACIAL CATEGORY 
Taunya Lovell Banks* 
 
[R]ace is at once an empty category and a powerful instrument. 
—Melissa Nobles1 
Racism is about race:  more races can lead . . . to changes in the way racism 
is presented, and ultimately to more, rather than less, racism. 
—Paulette M. Caldwell2 
INTRODUCTION 
The fiftieth anniversary of Loving v. Virginia,3 which struck down 
Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute, provides an opportunity to reflect on 
Loving’s impact.  A 2017 Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. Census 
Bureau data found that interracial marriages constitute 17 percent of all 
marriages,4 which represents an increase of 14 percent since the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Loving in 1967.5  One byproduct of the increase in 
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Continued Pursuit of Racial Equality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625 (2018). 
 
 1. MELISSA NOBLES, SHADES OF CITIZENSHIP:  RACE AND THE CENSUS IN MODERN 
POLITICS 12 (2000).  
 2. Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
53, 63 (1990). 
 3. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute violated the due 
process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 4. Gretchen Livingston & Anna Brown, Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 Years After Loving 
v. Virginia, PEW RES. CTR. (May 18, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/05/18/ 
intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia [https://perma.cc/3FYN-N2PP].  
 5. Jesse J. Holland, 1 in 6 Newlyweds’ Spouse Is of Different Race or Ethnicity, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 18, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/f0795fbaf4d04ca793d834 
f3d1eff57b [https://perma.cc/KQ99-WBHH].  The largest groups to intermarry are Asians (29 
percent) and Hispanics (27 percent). Id.  Blacks and whites intermarry at lower rates with 
whites having the lowest rate of intermarriage (11 percent for white compared to 18 percent 
for blacks), which suggests continued resistance to black-white interracial marriages. Id.  
“Despite those numbers, intermarriage is rapidly becoming more popular among blacks and 
whites.” Id. 
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interracial marriages is the growing number and prominence of multiracial 
children.  For example, a July 2017 Brookings Institution report characterizes 
Barack Obama, born six years before Loving, as the person who gave 
growing “prominence” to the emergence of multiracial people in America.6 
Increasingly, there is interest in the offspring of interracial unions and how 
they compare to monoracial individuals.  The Brookings Institution, for 
example, reported that “there is no test score gap between white and 
multiracial high school students.”7  The report seems to define “multiracial” 
very narrowly as people with parents from different racialized groups.8  Yet 
the multiracial population in the United States is not a new phenomenon.  By 
limiting multiracial “to first-generation children of interracial couples,”9 as 
others have, the report fails to acknowledge older and larger generations 
whose genealogical mixture is more distant.  Many of the people within this 
older multiracial population are racially classified by government and custom 
as black or African American, and they constitute “around 40 [percent] of the 
total population.”10  In contrast, according to the 2000 census, first-
generation multiracial individuals (including those with remote African 
ancestry) make up roughly 2 percent of the total population and are more 
likely to be seen as multiracial.11 
Proponents of a multiracial legal category complain that multiracial 
individuals are harmed by not being recognized under law as multiracial.  
Specifically, they argue that the law neither recognizes their personal identity 
nor protects their right to self-identify racially and to have that identity 
accepted.12  Despite the long history of multiracial people in the United 
States, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection constitutional jurisprudence, 
statutory antidiscrimination laws, and the census do not formally recognize a 
separate multiracial category.  Thus, the question is whether legal recognition 
is needed to remedy race-based discrimination experienced by multiracial 
individuals.13 
Historically, courts grappling with racial-identity questions looked at three 
factors, phenotypical characteristics, ancestry, and racial reputation in the 
community, to resolve the issue.14  The courts relied on a binary classification 
system of white and nonwhite; the underlying issue in these cases being 
whether one party had any nonwhite ancestry.  Thus, until recently, Barack 
 
 6. Jonathan Rothwell, Multiracial Adolescents Show No Test Score Gap with Whites, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (July 17, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/multi-racial-
adolescents-show-no-test-score-gap-with-whites/ [https://perma.cc/Y96K-HS6F]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Aaron Gullickson & Ann Morning, Choosing Race:  Multiracial Ancestry and 
Identification, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 498, 501 (2011). 
 10. Id. at 500–01. 
 11. Id.  
 12. See infra notes 24–30, 38 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Scot Rives, Note, Multiracial Work:  Handing Over the Discretionary 
Judicial Tool of Multiracialism, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1334 (2011).   
 14. See generally ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL:  A HISTORY OF RACE ON 
TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008).  For a more recent example, see Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339 
(Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Suffolk Cty. July 25, 1989). 
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Obama, despite his white mother, would be classified racially as black, since 
twentieth-century notions of race held that any known African ancestry made 
one black.15 
Admittedly, since Loving, conventional notions of race in the United States 
have “destabilized” as a result of “increases in immigration, intermarriage, 
and cross-racial adoptions.”16  Reflecting the era of racial self-
identification,17 racial categories are more fluid in the twenty-first century, 
even for people who, historically, racially classified as black.  These 
attitudinal changes are reflected in a 2007 Pew Research Center finding that 
“[n]early four-in-ten African Americans (37%) say that blacks can no longer 
be thought of as a single race” because of increasing diversity within that 
community.18 
Conventional blackness, where one is “black” if one’s African ancestry is 
visible or known,19 is on the wane.  As critical race theory legal scholar Neil 
Gotanda posits, race—particularly the racial category “black”—while a 
consistent and constant “social divider,” is not a “stable, coherent legal and 
social concept.”20  Today, people with some African ancestry may move 
away from blackness and, in some respects, the legal multiracial category 
movement is an example.21 
The focus of this Article is the underlying assumption of the Brookings 
Institution report that multiracial individuals constitute a separate racial 
category.  My discussion of legal racial categories focuses only on 
government “racial” definitions.  Multiracial individuals should enjoy the 
 
 15. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1737 (1993); see, 
e.g., Jason Carroll, Behind the Scenes:  Is Barack Obama Black or Biracial?, CNN (June 9, 
2008, 3:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/09/btsc.obama.race/ 
[https://perma.cc/3CDP-RAQT] (“A columnist examining Obama’s background summed up 
his racial identity into one equation:  white + black = black.”).   
 16. For a discussion and critique of these arguments, see David Roediger, The Retreat 
from Race and Class, MONTHLY REV. (July 1, 2006), http://monthlyreview.org/ 
0706roediger.htm [https://perma.cc/4WPT-UC5F]. 
 17. See Khaled A. Beydoun & Erika K. Wilson, Reverse Passing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 282, 
306 (2017) (discussing how, after the dissolution of the Naturalization Act, “[i]ndividual 
autonomy over racial identity became the norm, as individuals rather than courts became able 
to self-identity their own race”); Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race:  Recognizing Race 
Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-Identification, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1530 (2014) 
(arguing that the racial self-identification movement “assumes that many individuals will 
fluidly move between racial identities”). 
 18. PEW RESEARCH CTR., OPTIMISM ABOUT BLACK PROGRESS DECLINES:  BLACKS SEE 
GROWING VALUES GAP BETWEEN POOR AND MIDDLE CLASS 4, 24 (2007), 
http://pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/Race.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWK2-K4LE].  Younger 
black Americans, particularly those who were born after Loving, are more likely to report that 
blacks are no longer a single race. Id. 
 19. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind,’ 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24 
(1991).  
 20. Id. at 23.   
 21. Charles Byrd, organizer of the 1996 Multiracial Solidarity March in Washington, 
D.C., specifically rejects the notion that society treats “mixed-race” individuals “as a ‘subset’ 
of ‘blackness.’” JARED SEXTON, AMALGAMATION SCHEMES:  ANTIBLACKNESS AND THE 
CRITIQUE OF MULTIRACIALISM 57 (2008).  The Declaration of Racial Independence composed 
in 1997 by another multiracial advocate cites the “One Drop Rule” as a sign of racial hostility 
toward multiracial individuals. Id. at 68–69. 
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freedom to self-identify as they wish—and, like others, be afforded the 
protections of antidiscrimination law.  The question is whether a separate 
legal racial category is needed to provide that protection.  Race in this country 
has been “crafted from the point of view of [white] race protection”22—
protecting the interests of white Americans from usurpation by nonwhites 
and, unless the creation of a separate multiracial legal category advances this 
goal, change will be resisted. 
Commentaries grounded in Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause and federal statutory antidiscrimination jurisprudence shape the 
construction of racial categories in U.S. law.  This jurisprudence influences 
the racial categories and definitions used for the census.  The next Part briefly 
discusses the attempt to get a multiracial category on the U.S. census. 
I.  THE MULTIRACIAL RACE CATEGORY CONTROVERSY 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) acts as a gatekeeper 
designating the racial and ethnic categories used by the federal government 
in the census and on various government reporting forms.23  The push for a 
“multiracial” category on the U.S. census and the OMB’s directive on racial 
and ethnic standards for statistics dates back to the late 1970s.24  Early 
proponents were the white and black parents of multiracial children.25  Their 
primary concern was that children of these interracial marriages would be 
racially categorized as black.26  Attempts to add a multiracial category to 
census forms for the 1990 and 2000 censuses failed.27  Instead, for the 2000 
census, the compromise offered was the option of checking multiple race 
boxes.28  Not satisfied, the multiracial category movement (MCM) and some 
 
 22. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL:  THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 106 (2017). 
 23. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DIRECTIVE NO. 15:  
RACE AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING 
(1977), https://wonder.cdc.gov/WONDER/help/populations/bridged-race/Directive15.html 
[https://perma.cc/78BZ-9M36].   
 24. For a history of late twentieth-century efforts to better define racial categories used in 
the census, see HEATHER M. DALMAGE, TRIPPING ON THE COLOR LINE:  BLACK-WHITE 
MULTIRACIAL FAMILIES IN A RACIALLY DIVIDED WORLD 143–151 (2000).  
 25. Tanya K. Hernández, ‘Multiracial’ Discourse:  Racial Classifications in an Era of 
Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 106 (1998).  
 26. Id. (citing Lewis R. Gordon, Specificities:  Culture of American Identity:  Critical 
‘Mixed Race’?, 1 SOC. IDENTITIES 381, 382 (1995)).  See generally Kevin D. Brown, The Rise 
and Fall of the One-Drop Rule, in COLOR MATTERS:  SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF A 
POST-RACIAL AMERICA 44 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2013).  Arguably, the black-white 
parents of these children want to convey some of the “property interests” of whiteness to their 
biracial children. See Harris, supra note 15, at 1725 (arguing that whiteness comes with legally 
protected benefits, which are the property interests of whiteness). 
 27. Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities:  Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAW & 
INEQUALITY J. 183, 184–86 (1993); Rives, supra note 13, at 1315.  
 28. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and 
Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,788–90 (Oct. 30, 1997). 
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“multiracial identity legal scholars”29 continue to push for a separate racial 
category.30 
Critics of a multiracial category argue that the term is “too broad to be 
statutorily useful.”31  The question of definition is apparent when reviewing 
how states responded to the MCM’s push for a multiracial category on local 
data collection forms.  Between 1992 and 2000, several states enacted 
legislation or regulations acknowledging a multiracial category.32  But there 
is no agreement about who falls within the category.  A few states define 
multiracial as persons having biological parents of different races.33  Other 
state regulations (most often for public education forms) use the term without 
definition.34  Many states have rejected attempts to add a multiracial category 
to state forms.35 
 
 29. This term was coined by Tanya Hernández. Tanya Katerí Hernández, Racially-Mixed 
Personal Identity Equality, 15 LAW CULTURE & HUM. 1, 2–3 (2017). 
 30. Tina Fernandes, Antidiscrimination Law and the Multiracial Experience:  A Reply to 
Nancy Leong, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 213 (2013); Rives, supra note 13, at 
1334.  Not all multiracial legal scholars agree with this approach. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, 
Judicial Erasure of Mixed-Race Discrimination, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 469, 543–44 (2010) 
(arguing for a focus on racial perception rather than racial categories); Rich, supra note 17, at 
1569 (arguing for a legal right to racial self-definition).  Some multiracial advocates support 
abandoning racial categories altogether. SEXTON, supra note 21, at 69 (“[A]ny government 
classifying its citizenry by race perpetuates racism.” (quoting Nathan Douglas, Declaration of 
Racial Independence, INTERRACIAL VOICE (1997), https://web.archive.org/web/20000308 
064629/http://www.webcom.com/~intvoice/natdoug2.html)).  Others argue for “racial 
privacy.” Id. at 64. 
 31. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 140.  
 32. Kim M. Williams, Parties, Movements, and Constituencies in Categorizing Race:  
State-Level Outcomes of Multiracial Category Legislation, in STATES, PARTIES, AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 197, 200 (Jack A. Goldstone ed., 2003).   
 33. A LexisNexis search found only four state statutes recognizing a multiracial category 
and defining “multiracial” as biological parents of different races. See CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 8310.9(b)(1) (Deering 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-135(a) (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-
15-5.1-6.5(b) (Lexis 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 18.1206a(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2018). 
 34. See, e.g., 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 103.2.10 (2018) (describing data for education 
statistics); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.941(B) (LexisNexis 2017) (describing data for 
school statistics); OR. ADMIN. R. 705-010-0040(4)(e) (2018) (describing data for student 
groups); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.300.042, 28A.300.505 (2018) (describing data for 
school statistics).  According to one report, North Carolina had an “other” category, instead of 
“multiracial,” on forms used to collect data for educational institutions. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 98-034, STATE SURVEY ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
CLASSIFICATIONS 4 (1998), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/98034.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QSU-
2PNX]. 
 35. Other states opt to follow the federal model permitting multiracial persons to check 
more than one race box on state forms. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8310.9(b)(1); see also Racial 
Identification of Individuals Under the Maryland Criminal Justice System, 85 Md. Op. Att’y 
Gen. 38 (2000).  With the exception of New Hampshire, there is virtually no reported 
information explaining rejection of a multiracial category.  The reasoning by the New 
Hampshire state legislative committee provides some insights into why states may have 
rejected a multiracial category:  “While the committee was sympathetic to the intent of the 
sponsor, it was discovered that most, if not all, forms used by the state requiring this 
information are mandated by the federal government.  Any change to these state form[s] could 
result in the loss of federal funds.” H. Comm. on Exec. Dep’ts and Admin., H.R. 1997, Reg. 
Sess. (N.H. 1997), http://gencourt.state.nh.us/SofS_Archives/1997/house/HB259H.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WLE3-NMTD] (committee report on H.R. 259).  The Maryland State 
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Further, discrimination claims by multiracial individuals tend to mirror 
claims by monoracial plaintiffs.  Even in cases where multiracial individuals 
appear racially ambiguous, racial animus often arises after employers, 
property owners, school officials, and other decision makers learn of a 
person’s nonwhite ancestry.36  Thus, Tanya Hernández’s research of race 
discrimination claims by multiracial plaintiffs concludes that existing 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence is sufficient to address these claims.37 
Advocates for a multiracial legal category argue that the discrimination 
that multiracial individuals experience is grounded in their identification as a 
separate and distinct racial group.38  While there is admittedly a biological 
aspect to race, “biology is not fundamental.  The origins of race are 
sociocultural and political, and the main ways race is used are sociocultural 
and political.”39  Thus there also is sociopolitical content attributed to race.40  
Perhaps a more accurate characterization of efforts to obtain a multiracial 
category on the census and other government forms is that advocates want 
legal recognition of a sociopolitical racial category.41 
Further, multiracial is both an ascribed and a personal identity usually 
imposed on or adopted by children of interracial parentage.  Given the 
personal nature of racial identification for multiracials, “[t]here is no single 
multiracial population.”42  Thus, the larger question is whether 
multiracialism can be theorized as its own legal racial category.  The next 
Part more closely examines the claim for a multiracial legal racial category. 
II.  THEORIZING MULTIRACIALISM 
Advocates who “cast[] ‘multiraciality’ as a new social phenomenon” 
characterize the need for a multiracial category “as an issue of accuracy and 
fairness.”43  Their concern was that multiracial individuals lacked an option 
for accurately recognizing all of their heritage because “without proper racial 
 
Attorney General offered a similar justification. See Racial Identification of Individuals Under 
the Maryland Criminal Justice System, supra. 
 36. Hernández, supra note 29, at 3–5.   
 37. Id. 
 38. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 135. 
 39. Paul Spickard, Does Multiraciality Lighten?:  Me-Too Ethnicity and the Whiteness 
Trap, in NEW FACES IN A CHANGING AMERICA:  MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
290 (Loretta I. Winters & Herman L. DeBose eds., 2003) (citing The Illogic of American 
Racial Categories, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 16 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992)). 
 40. Osagie Obasogie’s empirical research of blind people’s notion of race illustrates how 
race is made visible by social practices. See generally OSAGIE K. OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY 
SIGHT:  SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE BLIND (2014).  
 41. According to OMB, “The racial and ethnic categories set forth in the standards should 
not be interpreted as being genetic, scientific, or anthropological in nature.  For the purposes 
of these standards, race is a socio-political construct.” FED. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. FOR 
RESEARCH ON RACE & ETHNICITY, INTERIM REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGET:  REVIEW OF STANDARDS FOR MAINTAINING, COLLECTING, AND PRESENTING FEDERAL 
DATA ON RACE AND ETHNICITY 6, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/whitehouse.gov/files/briefing-room/presidential-actions/related-omb-material/r_e_ 
iwg_interim_report_022417.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VAK-MTZU]. 
 42. Gullickson & Morning, supra note 9, at 510. 
 43. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 135. 
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and ethnic classifications, multiracial people are ‘invisible’ in the health care 
system.”44  The option of checking multiple boxes on the census addresses 
the first part of this complaint, but the second concern mistakenly treats race 
and ethnicity as necessary markers in biomedical research.45  It overlooks the 
fact that racial identity for many post-Loving multiracial individuals is 
personal and sometimes fluid—identity is not group based. 
It is important to remember that “[t]hroughout history, [powers within the 
United States used] racial designations . . . as tools of dominance, serving to 
separate and penalize those not defined as white.”46  Since “race is not 
grounded in genetics or nature, the project of defining races always involves 
drawing and maintaining boundaries between those races.”47  One question 
is what factors influence the drawing of boundaries. 
More than two decades ago, Neil Gotanda theorized about the racialization 
process in the United States.48  He continues to argue that the black-white 
racial paradigm in America is the product of “the erasure of tribe, ethnicity, 
and nationality” and the substitution of a largely two-race system:  black and 
white.49  Thus, discussions about the racialization of nonwhite groups, like 
Asian Americans, Latinos, and more recently Middle Eastern-North Africans 
(MENA), occur within the black-white paradigm.50  As such, the default 
inquiry by these other outsider groups is how close they are to blackness or 
whiteness.51  Given the strong preference for monoracial over multiracial 
 
 44. Id. (citing language from About Us, PROJECT RACE, 
http://www.projectrace.com/about_us/our_history/project-race/ [https://perma.cc/94A5-
RAFA] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018)). 
 45. For a criticism of the use of race or ethnicity in biomedical research, which argues that 
race is a social, not so much a biological, phenomenon, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Legal 
Constraints on the Use of Race in Biomedical Research:  Toward a Social Justice Framework, 
34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 526, 529 (2006); Taunya Lovell Banks, Funding Race as Biology:  The 
Relevance of ‘Race’ in Medical Research, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 571 (2011). 
 46. Kim M. Williams, Linking the Civil Rights and Multiracial Movements, in THE 
POLITICS OF MULTIRACIALISM:  CHALLENGING RACIAL THINKING 77, 78 (Heather M. Dalmage 
ed., 2004). 
 47. Abby L. Ferber, Defending the Creation of Whiteness:  White Supremacy and the 
Threat of Interracial Sexuality, in THE POLITICS OF MULTIRACIALISM:  CHALLENGING RACIAL 
THINKING, supra note 46, at 43, 46. 
 48. See generally Gotanda, supra note 19. 
 49. Neil Gotanda, The Racialization of Islam in American Law, 637 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 184, 187 (2011). 
 50. See, e.g., Aihwa Ong, Cultural Citizenship as Subject-Making:  Immigrants Negotiate 
Racial and Cultural Boundaries in the United States, 37 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 737, 739 
(1996) (claiming that “discriminatory modes of perception, reception, and treatment order 
Asian immigrants along a white-black continuum”); see also Caldwell, supra note 2, at 63–
67. 
 51. Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Race Inequity Fifty Years Later:  Language Rights Under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 167, 209 (2014) (“Under the black-
white paradigm, non-black minority groups can only seek legal redress to the extent to which 
they can successfully analogize their experience to that of African Americans.”).  For example, 
in challenging a Mississippi state law mandating the separation of white and “colored” school 
children, lawyers for the Chinese American child argued unsuccessfully that Chinese “stand 
nearer to the white race than they do to the negro race.” Brief for Appellees at 774, Rice v. 
Gong Lum, 104 So. 105 (1925) (No. 24-773), in 139 Miss. 760 (1925). 
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categories, and the measuring of legal race against whiteness, a more 
appropriate inquiry is whether the real racial binary is white versus nonwhite. 
Some legal scholars criticize the black-white racial binary as 
underinclusive.52  Early multiracial discourse reasserts a similar argument 
that “[m]ultiracial identity is a discrete and integral racial identity that stands 
alone; . . . not a subset of another racial identity.”53  The criticism mirrors 
that of other nonwhite groups.54  Nevertheless, the real complaint of many 
visible multiracial people is that they are racially categorized as nonwhite. 
However, not all multiracial scholars support a multiracial category.  Some 
oppose government-identified racial categories and see racial identity as 
personal and private.55  But, conventional racial categories are largely 
ascribed—externally imposed—not internally driven. 
In this regard, Gotanda identifies four ways that race appears in 
constitutional law jurisprudence:  status race—the inferior status of the racial 
category; formal race—the completion of a recognized formal category; 
historical race—a history of subordination by the superordinate group; and 
culture race—the presence of a distinct culture from collective group 
practice.56  Gotanda draws these categories directly from the black-white 
experiences and racial practices in the United States.  In that sense, they 
exemplify the black-white racial paradigm.  Assuming that these four usages 
of race accurately delineate the black-white racial categories, the next step is 
to apply them as criteria to test the proposed multiracial category. 
Gotanda’s status-race model seems to most closely approximate the claims 
of multiracial individuals, namely, that they are treated as a subordinated 
racialized people because of their interracial parentage.  But there is no 
negative ascribed racial profile applied to multiracial individuals by the 
dominant culture.  Although there is literature about the “tragic mulatto,” a 
stereotype grounded in the notion that the offspring of blacks and whites were 
tainted by their black ancestry and thus inferior to whites,57 governments, and 
the public, tend to treat racial categories as monoracial and mutually 
exclusive. 
Gotanda’s formal-race model also is inapplicable to multiracial 
individuals.  Until 1970, enumerators, in determining a person’s race for 
census purposes, were instructed in the case of multiracial individuals to 
select the nonwhite (or most subordinate group) when attaching a formal race 
 
 52. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race:  The ‘Normal 
Science’ of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1213, 1220 (1997).  
 53. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 132. 
 54. Caldwell, supra note 2, at 65–75. 
 55. RALINA L. JOSEPH, TRANSCENDING BLACKNESS:  FROM THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
MULATTA TO THE EXCEPTIONAL MULTIRACIAL 25 (2013); SEXTON, supra note 21, at 57 (“We 
reject the notion of white racial purity, and we affirm the right of otherwise self-determined 
individuals to identify as they see fit—not as others would force them to identify.” (quoting 
Charles Byrd, Founding Editor, Interracial Voice, Keynote Address at the First Annual 
Multiracial Solidarity March (July 20, 1996)).  Others assert that the existence and 
acknowledgement of multiracial people tends to “undermine[] the very categories of racism.” 
Spickard, supra note 39, at 291. 
 56. Gotanda, supra note 19, at 37–40, 56. 
 57. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 67. 
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to that individual.58  The census consistently resisted efforts to formally 
recognize a separate multiracial category.  Granted, terms signaling racial 
mixtures like “mulatto,” “quadroon,” and “octoroon” appeared in the census 
during the late nineteenth century,59 but they referred to subcategories of the 
racial category “black,” not separate racial categories.60  “Mixed-bloods,” 
defined as white-Native American mixtures, is the only consistent multiracial 
category recognized by the census.61 
Some multiracial legal identity scholars might argue that the formal 
erasure of multiracial individuals, subsuming them into existing monoracial 
categories, formalizes their racial nonexistence.  While this might be true, the 
question remains:  If racial identity is personal for most multiracial 
individuals, what harm does legal nonrecognition cause if adequate legal 
remedies exist when race-based discrimination occurs? 
Today, some social science literature, like the Brookings Institution study 
mentioned at the outset, offers a positive view of multiracial individuals, even 
multiracial individuals with remote African ancestry.  In the states that 
recognize “multiracial” as a separate legal racial category, multiracial is not 
maintained and reinforced by subordinating legal doctrine; rather, it serves 
an affirming function—not a subordinating one. 
Further, historic racial animus, reflected in antimiscegenation statutes, was 
directed toward intermarriage between monoracial people.  Granted, 
antimiscegenation statutes might create the perception of animus directed at 
multiracial children because intermarriage presented the possibility of 
multiracial children.62  However, there is no history of discrimination based 
on multiracial status because, until very recently, governments did not 
recognize multiracial people as a separate and distinct group.  Hernández 
explains that the racial discrimination most frequently cited by multiracial 
 
 58. See id. at 72; PEW RESEARCH CTR., MULTIRACIAL IN AMERICA:  PROUD, DIVERSE AND 
GROWING IN NUMBERS 19–32 (2015), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2015/06/2015-06-11_multiracial-in-america_final-updated.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BX5N-4AP2]. 
 59. “Mulatto” appeared in the census from 1870 until the 1930 census when enumerators 
were instructed to employ the “One-Drop” rule. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 52, 67–68.  The 
terms “quadroon” and “octoroon” appeared in the 1880 and 1890 censuses, but “the purpose 
was to determine the extent of racial mixture among blacks and whether the race was becoming 
more ‘purely Negro.’” Id. at 55. 
 60. Id. at 58.  The term “mulatto” included “quadroons, octoroons, and all persons having 
any perceptible trace of African blood.” Id. 
 61. Karl Eschbach et al., Changes in Racial Identification and the Educational Attainment 
of American Indians, 1970–1990, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 35, 35–36 (1998); Ann Morning, New 
Faces, Old Faces:  Counting the Multiracial Population Past and Present, in NEW FACES IN 
A CHANGING AMERICA:  MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 39, at 41, 
43–44. 
 62. See, e.g., Louisiana Justice Who Refused Interracial Marriage Resigns, CNN (Nov. 
3, 2009, 10:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/11/03/louisiana.interracial.marriage/ 
index.html [https://perma.cc/G7NB-QVF9] (describing the Louisiana Justice of the Peace who 
refused to marry an interracial couple because of his belief that children might be born of the 
union and interracial marriages do not last). 
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people surveyed is being called a “mono-racial” nonwhite racial slur.63  Thus, 
the claimed “racial” discrimination stems from multiracial individuals’ 
nonwhite ancestry.64 
Finally, there is no culture of multiracialism—no collective group cultural 
practices—because multiracialism is grounded in self-identity that varies 
widely among multiracial people.  Their situation is distinguishable from 
newer racialized groups like Asian Americans and Latinos.  Gotanda argues 
that what distinguishes the racial experiences of Asian Americans and 
Latinos from the black-white racial paradigm is culture.65  Each large group 
is a collection of ethnicities—they are pan-ethnic groups,66 many with 
different languages, histories, and cultural practices.  These groups are 
racially categorized based on their bodies—skin tone, phenotype, ancestral 
home—and assigned legal racial categories.67  These nonwhite groups have 
significant histories of subordination based on their assigned race or 
ethnicity.  In contrast, multiracial individuals see themselves as individuals, 
not as a group with similar histories, experiences, and cultures. 
As this suggests, it is unclear from the small number of discrimination 
claims filed by multiracial individuals whether any ascribed subordination 
occurs because of their multiracial bodies as opposed to the nonwhite aspect 
of their raced body.  Courts in racial discrimination cases involving 
multiracial claimants understand this point and, when making legal 
determinations, implicitly acknowledge the connection between ancestry, 
skin tone, phenotype, and racial categorization.68 
CONCLUSION 
Melissa Nobles writes:  “[c]ounting by race is justified precisely because 
of the subjectivity of race and its political salience in American life, not 
because of any objective reality.”69  The default racialization process is to 
“add on” new formal-race categories.  But these new categories—Asian 
American, Latino, or MENA—also include distinct and additional 
dimensions, which are consistent with Gotanda’s four usages of race and 
explain why these groups are neither black nor white by law. 
 
 63. Hernández, supra note 29, at 3.  Hernández writes that the type of racial discrimination 
most frequently cited by multiracial people “includes pointed, derogatory comments about 
non-whiteness and blackness in particular.” Id. 
 64. See Marc P. Johnston & Kevin L. Nadal, Multiracial Microagressions:  Exposing 
Monoracism in Everyday Life and Clinical Practice, in MICROAGGRESSIONS AND 
MARGINALITY:  MANIFESTATION, DYNAMICS AND IMPACT 123, 132–137 (Derald Wing Sue ed., 
2010). 
 65. Neil Gotanda, New Directions in Asian American Jurisprudence, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 
5, 31–33 (2010). 
 66. For a discussion of pan-ethnicity, see Robert S. Chang & Neil Gotanda, The Race 
Question in LatCrit Theory and Asian American Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 1012, 1015, 1023–
24 (2007). 
 67. The label “Asian American” only dates back to the 1960s. Gotanda, supra note 49, at 
188.  Gotanda identifies three dominant Asian American tropes:  foreignness, model-minority, 
and terrorist. Gotanda, supra note 65, at 38–46. 
 68. Rives, supra note 13, at 1319–20. 
 69. NOBLES, supra note 1, at 77. 
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But not all proposed add-on categories warrant legal recognition.  As the 
Supreme Court warned in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,70 simply 
placing a racial category in a law is insufficient to withstand closer scrutiny 
by courts faced with new categories.71  If accuracy in racial identification is 
the real concern, the multiple-boxes option seems to address this issue.  
Without more evidence, the claim that multiracial individuals constitute a 
separate racial group for census (or antidiscrimination) purposes fails to 
satisfy the criteria identified by Gotanda and used by the government. 
 
 
 70. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 71. See generally Neil Gotanda, Mapping the “Muslim” Category:  An Examination of 
Race, Identity, Religion, and the Black-White Racial Paradigm (May 15, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
